Hamlet v Abaddon: A Judicial Allegory on Euthanasia and Human Rights

Diego F. Soto-Miranda
May 5
3 min read

By Diego F. Soto-Miranda

Introduction

Euthanasia has long been one of the most ethically charged areas of law, sparking debate over autonomy, dignity, and public interest. In reflecting on this complexity, I chose to approach the subject through the lens of allegory, framing it as a fictional UK Supreme Court judgment between Mr Hamlet and Mr Abaddon. This method allowed me to unpack the legal principles at play while critiquing how the judiciary balances personal freedom against broader societal concerns, particularly under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Framing the Case: Hamlet v Abaddon

In this hypothetical scenario, Mr Hamlet suffers from a terminal degenerative condition. Desiring to end his life, he turns to Mr Abaddon, who is willing to assist but is prevented by the law. Together, they challenge Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, arguing that it infringes their rights under:

Article 3 ECHR: Protection against torture or degrading treatment.
Article 8 ECHR: The right to privacy and autonomy.

Their objective is to obtain a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Human Rights, Autonomy, and the Public Interest

At the heart of Hamlet’s claim lies a powerful argument: that denying assistance in dying constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment, and that his right to privacy should encompass control over his own death.

However, the role of the judiciary is not solely to validate personal freedoms; it must also safeguard vulnerable individuals and uphold the integrity of public policy. This tension becomes evident when we assess how Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the ECHR interact with domestic law.

Legal Analysis: Weighing Rights and Safeguards

Article 2: Right to Life

Article 2 enshrines the right to life, which has been consistently interpreted as imposing positive obligations on the state to protect life—not to facilitate its termination. To frame a right to death under this article would fundamentally contradict its protective purpose.

Article 3: Freedom from Inhuman or Degrading Treatment

While Hamlet’s suffering is undeniable, the Court must determine whether the prohibition on assisted suicide meets the threshold of degrading treatment. In my view, the answer is no. The law’s intent is to protect the vulnerable, and while it imposes hardship in individual cases, it does not violate Article 3.

Article 8: Right to Privacy

This is perhaps the most compelling argument. The right to autonomy and self-determination falls squarely within Article 8. Yet, the judiciary must weigh this against legitimate public interests—preventing abuse, protecting life, and preserving societal values. To permit assisted suicide would invite risks that could undermine these safeguards.

Language, Law, and Ethical Clarity

One of my concerns lies in the language often used in debates surrounding euthanasia. Euphemisms like "death with dignity" can obscure the gravity of the legal and ethical questions at stake. In the judgment, I emphasise the need for clarity and caution. Legal frameworks should never sanitise such profound decisions without fully grappling with their societal consequences.

Conclusion

Ultimately, I declined to find the Suicide Act incompatible with the ECHR. The judgment reflects the belief that while individual autonomy is crucial, it must be balanced against the collective responsibility to protect life and uphold public interest.

Euthanasia presents an emotionally and legally fraught issue. But as this allegorical case illustrates, our legal system must proceed with deliberate care, ensuring that the rights of individuals do not compromise the dignity and security of society as a whole.

Diego F. Soto-Miranda is a barrister specialising in commercial, defamation and human rights law. For further insights or to discuss representation, get in touch via email.